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Wheeler

Extracts from speech on the bill for the relief of Fitz John Porter.

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EXTRACTS FROM

SPEECH

OF

# HON. JOSEPH WHEELER,

OF ALABAMA,

IN THE

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES,

THURSDAY, FEBRUARY 15, 1883.

WASHINGTON.
1883.

# EXTRACTS FROM SPEECH

OF

# HON. JOSEPH WHEELER.

---

The House having under consideration the bill (S. 1844) for the relief of Fitz-John Porter—

Mr. WHEELER said:

Mr. SPEAKER: As regards the conduct of man to man, the highest command given is that he do unto others even as he would that others should do unto him; and when wrong is done to any man it should be restored to him twofold.

If this mandate should be observed by men, how imperatively should it be the law to govern sovereignties of men! And if reparation must be made to all men, by what rules of measurement should a nation make restitution for the wrongs inflicted upon a public servant whose patriotic, faithful, and heroic service has given luster to her military renown?

* * * * * * *

My object in saying these words to the lovers of right throughout our land is to add my feeble mite toward the establishment of truth, the vindication of honor, and the upholding of the sublime principles of justice.

In order to illustrate some of the foregoing remarks and positions, I take the liberty of adding a number of curious and instructive cases, all historical, involving and elucidating the subject of military punishments for insubordination and dereliction of official duty. These cases show the danger of hasty trials in times of great tumult and of those high and turbulent excitements which usually exist in times of war; when nations are contending in arms on the field of battle, amid scenes of slaughter and the thunders of artillery; when the nerves of men are strained to the utmost, and their minds are thrown out of that quiet equilibrium so necessary to weigh with deliberation the testimony which sways the judgment involving the life or honor of eminent men.

The history of wars is full of gloomy records which show the hasty

conviction of the most honorable and innocent men; and some of these, to which I here call attention, show that time has exculpated many a victim of injustice, where history in discovering innocence had to weep over the dead who had passed away from earth under clouds of infamy, too far removed to hear the voice of vindication as it sweeps over the grasses and turfs of the defamed grave—a vindication powerless to do aught but to revive the melancholy memory of a blasted name.

All the persons were very distinguished officers, all were convicted upon evidence which time showed was either false or insufficient, and all have been vindicated by history, notwithstanding great efforts on the part of their prosecutors to repress and hide the development of truths.

* * * * * * *

But the recent centennial anniversaries of the capture of Stony Point and the surrender of Lord Cornwallis at Yorktown have called our attention to one of the bravest actors in those battles, whose fate makes a record of the most atrocious outrage which ever disgraced the annals of military jurisprudence.

GENERAL HULL'S CASE.

General William Hull, a gentleman of the highest culture and attainments, was among the first of the Revolutionary patriots who rushed to the defense of our country. He served with great distinction as an officer of the line

UNDER WASHINGTON

at the siege of Boston, and in the battles of Trenton, Princeton, and Monmouth.

General Washington, in his published letter to Major-General Heath, dated December 13, 1779, says:

> Colonel Hull is an officer of great merit, and whose services have been honorable to himself and honorable to his country.

In the summer of 1780 General Washington solicited him to accept a position upon his staff as aid-de-camp, which appointment he declined at the earnest request of Major-General Baron Steuben, inspector of the Army, under whom Hull was then serving as inspector-general of the division of Major-General Howe. Baron Steuben visited General Washington especially on this subject, and stated to both General Washington and Colonel Hull that he "Hull, would be more useful in the office

of inspector than in any other situation, and hoped such considerations would influence their decision for him to remain."

Colonel Hull also fought under General Lee at White Plains, under General St. Clair at Ticonderoga, and under General Gates in the battles of the 19th of September and the 1st and 3d of October, and in the capture of Burgoyne's army at Saratoga.

Hull also commanded and led his regiment, four hundred strong, in the assault and capture of Stony Point, and for his great gallantry in that battle he received the

PARTICULAR THANKS

of General Wayne and General Washington and Congress.

By General Washington's special permission, given in his published letter of January 7, 1881, Colonel Hull attacked and defeated the enemy at Morrisania.

Major-General Heath, in a letter dated December 30, says:

> The success of this Morrisania enterprise was doubtful in the opinion of General Washington, but Colonel Hull, with the troops under his command, was successful. With great address and gallantry they forced a narrow passage to the enemy, and with the loss of one subaltern, one drummer, and ten privates killed, one captain, one sergeant, and eleven rank and file wounded, completely defeated the enemy, and, besides the killed and wounded, took upward of fifty prisoners, cut away the ponton bridges, took a considerable quantity of forage, a number of cattle, &c., for which they were thanked in public orders.

General Heath also states twice in this letter that—

> Colonel Hull sustained a conspicuous character of a brave and good officer and possessed the particular esteem and confidence of General Washington.

Colonel Hull continued in active service during the entire war of the Revolution.

For gallantry at Dorchester Heights, White Plains, and Trenton General Washington promoted him to the rank of major.

His heroic conduct at Princeton, Ticonderoga, Bemis Heights, Stillwater, Saratoga, Monmouth, and Stony Point won him promotion to lieutenant-colonel, and he was acting under the orders of Washington with the rank of colonel when Cornwallis surrendered in 1781.

When the Army was disbanded at the close of the war Hull was tendered by Washington the appointment as

LIEUTENANT-COLONEL OF THE ONLY REGIMENT

which was retained in the service, and when the Army was organized in 1799 for the anticipated war with France he was selected by Washington as one of the major-generals.

General Hull was appointed commissioner to make treaties with the Indians 1798; appointed judge of the court of common pleas 1798; was State senator 1798 to 1805, and governor of Michigan 1805 to 1812.

Appointed brigadier-general regular Army 1812, and declined (see evidence of Secretary of War Eustis, page 3, Appendix Hull's Trial). Again appointed brigadier-general regular Army to command troops at Detroit, which appointment was conferred and accepted for the distinct purpose of enabling him to better protect settlers in Michigan from Indian depredations. This appointment was coupled with the assurance on the part of the Government that in the event of a war with England a naval force would be placed upon Lake Erie, as General Hull had previously suggested in a paper laid before the Secretary of War, showing that in that contingency Detroit could not be held unless the lake was thus kept under our control.

Before reaching Detroit, and before he had any intimation of the declaration of war with England, the entire baggage of his troops with the hospital stores and implements, was captured on Lake Erie by the British, and Fort Mackinaw, a post north of Detroit, had also fallen into their hands.

General John Armstrong, who afterward became Secretary of War and an opponent of Hull, in his notice of the war of 1812 (page 47), thus censures Secretary of War Eustis for this disaster:

> We have seen that General Hull lost his own baggage and that of the army, the whole of his hospital stores and intrenching tools, and sixty men in consequence of the ill-judged and tardy manner employed in transmitting to him the declaration of war. A fact so extraordinary in itself and so productive of injury to the public calls for more development than has yet been given to it.
>
> Still more extraordinary was the fact that the news of the declaration of war reached the Canadian authorities some days before it reached General Hull, and this under the frank of a Washington official, this error or treason being the direct cause of the disaster.

With Lake Erie under the undisputed control of the British and the entire line of march to Detroit being filled with hostile Indians, all military men of experience considered the few hundred men under Hull, detached as they were two hundred and fifty miles from re-enforcements or supplies, as

VIRTUALLY SACRIFICED

by the declaration of war with England.

General William Henry Harrison, afterward President, writes to the Secretary of War, August 6, 1812:

> The information received a day or two ago from Detroit is of the most un-

pleasant nature. The loss of Mackinaw will probably be followed by the capture of Fort Dearborn. It is my opinion that it will be the object of the British to draw as many of the Indians as possible toward Malden to cut off the supplies from and ultimately to capture General Hull's army.—*Clarke's History of Campaign of* 1812, page 396.

The Government appreciated this, and suggested that Colonel Wells should re-enforce Detroit with a large detachment and convey rations and supplies to Hull.

General Harrison deemed this hardly practicable, thinking it would only add to the force sacrificed. Harrison, in replying to this suggestion in his letter of August 10, 1812 (Dawson's Life of Harrison, page 275), says:

I greatly fear the capture of Mackinaw will give such éclat to the British and Indians that the northern tribes will pour down in swarms upon Detroit, oblige General Hull to act on the defensive, and meet and perhaps overpower the convoys and re-enforcements which may be sent him. It appears to me, indeed, highly probable that the large detachment which is now destined for his relief under Colonel Wells will have to fight its way. I rely greatly on the valor of these troops, but it is possible that the event may be adverse to us, and if it is Detroit must fall.

(See Clarke's Campaign of 1812, page 397.)

The Government appreciated these views and was deeply impressed with the jeopardy in which Hull's force was placed, and directions were given to create a diversion at the east end of Lake Erie to induce a withdrawal of a portion of the enemy which was in front of Hull, and thus release the pressure upon the beleagured forces at Detroit. General Hull had frequently in his letters shown the necessity of such a diversion. (Appendix to Hull's Trial, 38.)

During July the often-repeated orders of the Secretary of War to General Dearborn, who commanded the entire northern army, was similar to the following paragraph in the orders to General Dearborn dated August 1, cited in Appendix No. 10 to Armstrong's Notices of the War of 1812; also Appendix to Hull's Trial, page 38:

You will make a diversion in favor of him (General Hull) at Niagara and Kingston as soon as it may be practicable.

Major-General Dearborn neglected to make the slightest movement to comply with these instructions, but in direct violation of these orders made an armistice with the enemy,

EXCLUDING HULL'S FORCE

from its benefits, which enabled the British Major-General Brock and Sir George Prevost (who had full control of Lake Erie) to throw their entire army and thousands of Indians upon Hull and compel the surren-

der of his little undisciplined and unprovisioned force of seven hundred men.

In the life of Sir George Prevost this armistice is thus spoken of:

A *ruse de guerre* as creditable to the shrewdness and sagacity of Sir George Prevost as it was disreputable for the obtuseness or treachery of General Dearborn.

No. 11 of Armstrong's Notices of the War of 1812, in the appendix, is the following extract of a letter from Sir George Prevost to General Brock:

I consider it most fortunate that I have been able to prosecute this object of the government [the armistice] without interfering with your operations on the Detroit.

(See Clarke's History, page 355.)

General Armstrong, afterward Secretary of War (volume 1, page 97 in his Notices of the War of 1812), says:

We have already stated that to lessen the pressure on General Hull, Major-General Dearborn was directed to make such movements against the British posts in his front as would have the effect of preventing them from re-enforcing the garrison at Malden, or otherwise altering the relation as to strength which had hitherto existed between Hull and Proctor.

But for this service the major-general had made no preparation and appeared to have little relish, as on the very day on which he was thus instructed by the Government (though sufficiently apprised that detachments had been sent to Malden and that the situation of Hull was becoming more critical every moment) he did not hesitate to enter into an armistice by which he completely disabled himself from giving any aid to that officer either by vigorously assailing the British posts in his front (now rendered comparatively weak by the absence of Brock and the troops carried with him) or by extending to him and his army the benefits of the temporary suspension of hostilities into which he had entered.

(See Clarke's Campaign of 1812, page 354.)

On August 12, 1812, General Hull's situation was as follows: His last letter from the War Department (July 9) informed him that he must

NOT RELY UPON RE-ENFORCEMENTS.

On the north, Michilimackinac had fallen, and 3,200 Indian warriors were marching upon Detroit from that quarter. The lake which lay to the south of Detroit and east was under the undisputed control of the British. On the south or southwest a dense forest for over two hundred miles, filled with hostile Indians, separated him from the nearest settlements. The detachments under Major Van Horn, Colonel Miller, and Colonels Cass and McArthur, which had attempted to penetrate this forest and succor a much needed and hoped-for convoy with provisions, had been checked or driven back by the hordes of Indians who, aided and directed by British officers, had established strong fortifica-

tions within fourteen miles of Detroit. To the west was an unexplored wilderness.

Letters just received from Generals Hall and Porter, who commanded small posts to the east on Lake Erie, informed him that—

A large number of boats filled with British troops had passed over to Fort Malden, and that the British forces with the Canadian militia and savages on the opposite side of Niagara River were moving by water to the same point; and at the same time General Hull was informed that nothing could be done to check their movements, and that no assistance or co-operation could be afforded to him.

General Hull's troops, estimated by his brigade-major, Jessup, and Colonel Cass at from 750 to 1,060 officers and men, which included teamsters, laborers, and other non-combatants, were ignorant, undisciplined, and many of them imbued with a spirit of insubordination and mutiny, fostered and encouraged, and in some cases even initiated, by militia officers of all grades, including colonels of regiments. They were without efficient arms, with but little ammunition, and were deficient in supplies of all kinds. (See Colonel Miller's evidence, Hull's Trial, pages 116 and 117; also, Appendix No. 2, Hull's Trial, page 14; also, Memoirs of Campaign of 1812, page 61.)

In his front was Major-General Brock with a thoroughly equipped and disciplined army, with no limit to the vast hordes of Indians which were anxious to obey his orders, and the armistice which Sir George Prevost had effected with

MAJOR-GENERAL DEARBORN

placed at General Brock's disposal as many thousand British troops as he could possibly desire.

In addition to the above, General Brock had subject to his command the entire Canadian militia, which numbered more than 18,000 men. (See Memoirs of 1812, pages 19 and 20.)

This was the condition of affairs when Major-General Brock wrote as follows:

*August*, 15, 1812.

General WILLIAM HULL:

The force at my disposal authorizes me to require of you the immediate surrender of Fort Detroit. It is far from my intention to join in a war of extermination; but you must be aware that the numerous bodies of Indians who have attached themselves to my troops will be beyond my control the moment the contest commences.

You will find me disposed to enter into such conditions as will satisfy the most scrupulous sense of honor. Lieutenant-Colonel McDowell and Major Glegg are fully authorized to conclude any arrangement that may lead to prevent the unnecessary effusion of blood.

ISAAC BROCK, *Major-General.*

General Hull was

as well as commander of the troops at Detroit. His pride as a soldier induced him to reply that he was prepared to meet any force at his disposal and any consequence which might result from it. (Hull's Trial, Appendix 2, page 23.)

General Brock opened a severe fire from his batteries and advanced his troops to the attack.

Hull left the inclosed fort in person, rode to his advanced battery under a heavy fire and superintended the dispositions for defense.

The evidence of Major Munson and Captains Dyson and Maxwell says: "General Hull's bearing was cool and collected." (See Hull's Trial, pages 128–131, 133.)

Notwithstanding the hopelessness of the situation General Hull continued to make

ALL POSSIBLE PREPARATION FOR DEFENSE;

but during the night one hundred of his men deserted with their arms to the British standard, confirming the previous statements of the militia colonels that these men could not be relied upon. The Michigan militia had been for years separated by vast forests from American settlements. Social and business relations and frequent marriage connections with the Canadians had caused a growth of identity of feeling and interest. (Memoirs of 1812, page 60.)

Most of the remainder of Hull's forces were Ohio militia; the same troops who had refused to march at Urbana; the same troops which Colonel Miller referred to in his evidence when he stated that Colonel Brush said on the morning of the capitulation, "his men would run away to a man." (Hull's Trial, page 125.)

The same troops whose mutiny Colonel Miller's regiment suppressed while *en route* to Detroit. (Hull's Trial, page 125; and Memoirs of Campaign 1812, page 35.)

The same troops

WHO REFUSED TO OBEY ORDERS

to cross the river into Canada. The same troops which Colonel Cass said would desert to a man if ordered to take post at the Miami. (Hull's Trial, page 33; Memoirs, page 65.)

The same troops which Lieutenant Bacon testified were without subordination or discipline, and who were frequently disorderly, and who rode their officers upon a rail.

The same troops Lieutenant Bacon saw refuse to obey orders, the same

troops referred to when he heard Colonel Miller informed that there was another mutiny among the Ohio militia, and the same troops to whom he alluded when as a staff officer he gave to Colonel Miller an order to suppress the mutiny.

The same troops which were referred to when the commander said to Colonel Miller: "Your regiment is a powerful argument; without it I could not march these volunteers to Detroit." (See Hull's Trial, pages 124 and 125.)

The senior officer of these troops was

COLONEL CASS,

who admitted that he encouraged his troops to refuse to obey orders which they did not approve, notwithstanding the fact that they had never heard a hostile gun, and notwithstanding the further fact that their commander was a veteran of thirty battles and enjoyed the implicit confidence of General Washington, and for twenty years had been his tried and trusted friend. (See Cass's letter, Memoirs, page 65.)

Cass also openly admitted (see Hull's Trial, Appendix No. 2, page 26) that two days previous to the attack these officers were engaged in a mutinous conspiracy which he says Hull prevented by sending two colonels off on detachments.

In Memoirs of Campaign of 1812, page 60, we find the following:

> In addition to all this combination of force which was proceeding against me symptoms appeared in the interior of my camp not less alarming; the spirit of mutiny which before had manifested itself in whispers increased and became more open. It was evident it was now fostered and encouraged by the principal officers of the militia and was fast rising into an avowed conspiracy.

This was the condition of the garrison of Detroit when its commander found himself confronted by the forces of Sir George Prevost and Major-General Brock with

ALL THE MILITARY RESOURCES OF ENGLAND

then in Canada at their disposal. General Dearborn, the commander-in-chief of the American army, having stipulated and agreed that the American army would remain quiet during an indefinite period, during which the entire resources of England then in Canada were left free to overpower and capture the troops under General Hull, at daylight on the 16th

GENERAL HULL WAS WITH HIS TROOPS

outside the fort engaging the enemy.

He had learned that Dearborn's armistice had thrown upon him all

the British troops, Canadian militia, and Indians on the northern frontier.

He also learned that in addition to this combination and increase of the enemy's force, contrary to all expectation, the Wyandots, Chippewas, Ottawas, Pottawatomies, Munsees, and Delawares, all tribes of Indians who had been counted upon as friendly with Americans, had gone over and joined the British standard. (Hull's Trial, Appendix No. 2, page 14.)

A report dated after the loss of Detroit, published in a French Canadian paper, gives the following as the British force in Canada:

| | |
|---|---|
| Royal Artillery | 500 |
| First Royal Scots Infantry, first battalion | 1,200 |
| Eighth Regiment, King's Own | 1,000 |
| Forty-first Regiment, first battalion | 900 |
| Forty-first Regiment, second battalion | 350 |
| Forty-ninth Regiment | 700 |
| One Hundredth Regiment | 900 |
| One Hundred and Third Regiment | 800 |
| One Hundred and Fourth Regiment | 750 |
| First Veteran Battalion | 500 |
| Canadian Fencibles | 800 |
| Nineteenth Dragoons | 500 |
| Glengary Fencibles | 800 |
| Voltigeur Corps | 800 |
| Embodied militia, about | 6,000 |
| Two troops volunteer cavalry | 150 |
| Three companies chasseurs | 150 |
| Eighty-ninth Regiment | 500 |
| German Legion, called De Walteville's | 1,600 |
| Total | 18,900 |

One of the detachments General Hull had sent with orders for Colonels Cass and McArthur to join him now came in, having been driven back by the enemy, and reported their inability to continue upon their mission. (Hull's Trial, Appendix No. 2, page 15.)

The fort, or rather inclosure, which was a fort only in name, had become filled with women, children, and old and decrepit people of the town and country. The enemy's fire had already killed some of those helpless people, and they could not retire back of the town without being killed by the Indians.

The whole effective force under General Hull were new troops unaccustomed to camp life. A laborious march, a number of combats and skirmishes, in which a portion of these troops had engaged, a large amount of sickness, and a want of medicines and comforts had still further reduced his strength of effective troops. (Hull's Trial, Appendix No. 2, page 15–16.)

While in this defenseless condition Major Anderson brought the intelligence that two companies, the advanced post under Captains Knagg and Shover, had gone over to the enemy, while at the same time Colonel Brush exclaimed to his general, "By God, every man of his regiment had or would desert to the British" (Hull's Trial, page 123; also Appendix, pages 91–93), events adverse to General Hull and over which he had no control had transpired in rapid succession—

First. The fall of Mackinaw and Chicago, and the destruction of the garrison of the latter place.

Second. The absolute impossibility of procuring ammunition and provisions.

Third. The failures of convoys with supplies to make their way to him from the settlements.

Fourth. The general uprising of the Canadian militia and the fact that all the savages, including many tribes heretofore friendly, had joined the British standard.

Fifth. The ignorance, disaffection, conspiracy, and mutiny which pervaded his troops, culminating in desertion to the enemy.

Sixth. The action of General Dearborn in failing to comply with orders from the Secretary of War to make a diversion in General Hull's favor.

Seventh. The astounding conduct of Dearborn in agreeing to an armistice which turned all the British forces upon General Hull's small detachment. This was the situation when, on the 16th day of August, General Hull found his most advanced post had deserted and joined the British troops.

The information regarding the extent and character of General Dearborn's armistice was confirmed by official papers in the possession of General Brock, which were sufficient to justify Hull in the belief that General Dearborn entered into the armistice with the view that the



which would inevitably result would be compensated for by advantages which he expected to gain in other localities.

The hundred or more of his men who had deserted during the night were now with Major-General Brock, and that officer was now thoroughly informed regarding the deplorable condition of Hull's force, their limited supplies and ammunition, and the disaffection and mutinous spirit which prevailed. It was clear a further effort at battle would accomplish nothing, and it was equally clear that

would follow should further progress of the conflict be permitted.

No alternative was left but to capitulate to General Brock while it was still in the power of that officer to protect the non-combatants from the knife of the savages. It was impossible under the circumstances to avert defeat, and it was clear that even a temporary success over General Brock would avail nothing, as the rapidly approaching force both of British and Indians would in a few hours number twenty armed men to every fighting soldier under his command.

The terms exacted by General Hull secured an immediate parole and return to their homes of most of the garrison, making, however, no stipulations favorable to himself.

NOT A WORD OF CENSURE WAS HEARD EITHER BY THE ARMY OR PEOPLE.

General Armstrong, in his notices of the war of 1812, No. 10, says:

> The inaction by General Dearborn, which enabled Brock to leave his posts on the Niagara undisturbed and unmenaced, and even to carry with him a part of his force to Detroit and there to capture Hull, his army, and territory, was not noticed by any kind of disapprobation on the part of the Government. The inference is fair that it (the Government) was willing to take the responsibility on itself.

The edition September fifth of The War, a newspaper said to have been published, at least in a measure, under the auspices of the Government, contains the account of the loss of Detroit, in which it uses these words:

> General Hull's army is represented as having been in the greatest distress. They were almost destitute of provisions, and many of them were sick. It is said that eight hundred only were able to do duty.

The same article also said:

> To whom to attribute this great national disaster we do not know, but conjecture that the blame will fall upon the Secretary of War.

The Administration did not attempt to deny that all the blame attending the loss of these troops rested entirely upon them or upon General Dearborn, whose situation was such as to really make him a part of the Administration.

This is supported by the following letter taken from Records of the War Office, volume 6, page 253:

WAR DEPARTMENT, *December* 18, 1812.

> SIR: Your letter of the 11th is received. Fortunately for you, the want of success which has attended the campaign will be attributed to the Secretary of War. So long as you enjoy the confidence of the Government the clamor of the discontented should not be regarded.

You are requested to make an exchange of General Hull as soon as possible.

WILLIAM EUSTIS,
*Secretary of War.*

Major-General DEARBORN.

Colonel Cass had left Detroit on the 14th of August with most of the able bodied and best equipped soldiers of the command.

On the 15th, when Detroit was attacked by General Brock, Hull sent orders for Colonel Cass to return, which order he made no preparation to obey.

At the capitulation on the 16th Colonel Cass was left to choose whether he would take the risk of cutting his way through to the settlement or returning under General Brock's pledge of British protection from the savages.

Though two days' march from Detroit, he returned, and Colonels Cass and McArthur and the men under their command were paroled and returned to their homes.

The most pronounced division in political opinion at this time was between the war party and those who believed it was unnecessary and ought to have been averted.

The Administration and war party were severely censured for their management, which resulted in the disaster at Detroit.

The Presidential election was now about to take place, and the effort of any one tending

TO TURN THE TIDE OF DISAPPROBATION

from the door of the administration was most earnestly desired.

Colonel Cass arrived in Washington in this crisis. He was politician enough to see a road to promotion and preferment, and with a British parole in his pocket he commenced a series of letters, which abounded in misrepresentation, and sought to shield the Secretary of War and General Dearborn and cast the blame resulting from their errors upon General Hull, who was a prisoner at Montreal.

The leading papers were supporters of the Administration and largely elaborated the opinions and

MISSTATEMENTS OF COLONEL CASS,

all of which had a very appreciable effect upon the public mind.

The force surrendered by Hull was falsely stated to have been 2,500, when in fact after the desertions on the night of the 15th he had less than 600.

Cass, a militia colonel, without even having been in battle, was ap-

pointed to the rank of brigadier-general in the regular Army, and others who were at Detroit and who aided the statement of and sustained Cass were also liberally promoted.

Cass and his coadjutors insisted that if Hull had held out, supplies and re-enforcements would have been brought to succor him.

Subsequent experience showed that

HULL WAS RIGHT

in not relying upon such a contingency. After the loss of this meager force General Harrison was placed in command of the Northwest with over 10,000 men and ordered to penetrate to Detroit. By October 22, 1812, he had made no progress, and writes to the Government as follows:

> To get supplies forward through a swampy wilderness of near two hundred miles in wagons or on pack-horses which are to carry them provisions is absolutely impossible. (See Armstrong's Notes of the War, volume 1, page 59; also Clarke's Northern Campaign, page 373.)

And it was not until after Perry's victory, in September, 1813, had opened Lake Erie that Harrison was able to act against Detroit, which he then captured without resistance.

Again, General Cass stated in his letter of September 10, 1812, which he reiterated as his opinion in his evidence upon General Hull's trial, that provisions could have been procured in the country around Detroit.

This was not true, and it was afterward proven that little more than a month previous to September 10, when General Cass had no purpose to subserve, he was writing letters asserting precisely a contrary opinion of the condition of the country. (Clarke's Campaign of 1812, page 369; Memoirs of 1812, page 60.)

HOW CRIMINALLY UNJUST

to censure Hull for not holding Detroit under such circumstances, and how equally unjust to censure him for not cutting his way through to the American settlement. His effective force, as before stated, was hardly six hundred strong. His road required a détour for sixty miles to the southwest along the bank of the lake, making it necessary for him to cross all rivers and streams at their mouth, all of which, together with the lake, were under the undisputed control of the British, with their army and Indian allies and a naval force consisting of five vessels of war and a number of gunboats, some of the British vessels carrying twenty cannon, (see Memoirs of 1812, page 27), while at the same time

turned the entire force of the English and Indians to attack him by both land and water, and impede his march at every step. Two months later Major-General Harrison, with 10,000 men, found and reported it impossible to penetrate the forest from the settlement to Detroit, and this, too, after the armistice had terminated and only a small portion of the British and Indians were opposing him, and when no portion of the British navy was in position to menace his line of march. (See Memoirs of 1812, page 73.)

Again, Colonel Cass by his conduct also showed Hull was right.

When Hull was attacked Colonel Cass was two days' march en route for the States, with three hundred picked men, all of the healthy and effectives of his own and McArthur's regiments. He was well ammunitioned and unincumbered with luggage.

Major-General Brock and Sir George Prevost were engaged against Hull; yet Colonel Cass, with all these advantages, dared not attempt to reach the settlement, and gladly

MARCHED TO DETROIT AND SURRENDERED

himself and command to the British forces.

With what propriety could Hull have attempted the same march, with the women and the sick and feeble and attacked at every step by the armies of Sir George Prevost and Major-General Brock, aided by the vast hordes of Indians which these officers controlled. That General Hull did right is now the verdict of every honest and intelligent man in America, and every informed and honest historian of the present day justifies him in every particular. So clearly was General Hull justified by the Administration that any thought of censuring him was not in any way suggested.

On the contrary, the Secretary of War, after four months' deliberation, writes, under date of December 18, 1812:

> The want of success which has attended this campaign will be attributed to the Secretary of War.—*Clarke's Campaign of* 1812, page 421.

It was clear that General Dearborn and the Administration had brought about the disaster, and it was difficult to see how any one could so pervert facts as to relieve them from the responsibility. At first no attempt was made, but the Administration soon found, or rather had forced upon them, a man ready and willing to do anything which would give him preferment with those in power. That man was Colonel Cass, who, as

before stated, soon appeared in Washington, and, with a British parole in his pocket, commenced by

BASE FALSEHOODS

to decry his old commander, then in a British prison, at the same time lauding himself, General Dearborn, and the Administration. Colonel Cass was a man of talent and plausibility, but he showed in this that in a matter of personal interest scruples had to be subordinated to ambition. He sought by his letters to protect the Administration and General Dearborn and to place the entire blame upon General Hull. He asserted that Hull wanted neither men nor supplies of any kind, that the Army was in all respects in good condition, and that the British might easily have been defeated.

These letters soon had the effect which Cass and his supporters sought to produce upon the public, who did not know that this same Colonel Cass had written to Governor Meigs and to his own brother-in-law a few days before the surrender—

> That the Army was in want of everything and must perish unless soon assisted.

Also using expressions in his letters to them of which the following is a sample:

> Our situation is become critical. Bad as you may think our situation, it is still worse than you can believe.

Cass also knew, but kept it a secret, that his friends, whom he relied upon to join in accusation against Hull, and who did join in those accusations, were deserting so rapidly that regiments were becoming depleted, and that a hundred of them did desert to the enemy on the night after the action of August 15.

Cass also knew, but did not make it public, that Colonel Brush, one of Hull's accusers, on the morning of the capitulation, upon hearing that the most advanced post had deserted to the British, rushed up to General Hull, exclaiming "By God!" or "he believed, by God, that his men would desert to a man." (See pages 91 and 93, Appendix to Hull's Trial.

Cass also knew that Lieutenant-Colonel Miller had positively refused to be commanded by either Colonels Cass or McArthur or Findley, and that the entire force was in a state of insubordination. Cass also knew, but withheld the fact, that on another occasion Colonel Brush publicly

announced and told General Hull "he believed that his men would run away to a man." (See Hull's Trial, page 125.)

There was no one to rectify these falsehoods by publishing General Harrison's letter of August 6, 1812, which states that, even under conditions much more favorable than those which surrounded Hull on August 16, "Detroit must fall." Nor did any one show that, while Cass and the Administration and General Harrison regarded Hull's position as critical, he was cruelly sacrificed by the failure of General Dearborn to obey orders and make a diversion in favor of General Hull, but who on the contrary made an armistice and threw the whole British force in Canada upon him.

Hull was a dignified gentleman, who, to refute all accusations, asked for an immediate trial.

A court was ordered, consisting of the following officers: Brigadier-Generals Wade Hampton, James Bloomfield, and H. Burbeck; Colonels E. Izard and A. McComb, artillery; J. Burn, cavalry; J. Simonds, J. Kingsbury, J. Parker, H. Brady, W. H. Winder, and P. P. Schuyler, infantry. Supernumeraries: Lieutenant-Colonels W. Scott, artillery; J. Chrystie and R. Dennis, infantry; and A. J. Dallas, judge-advocate.

General Hull hastened before this tribunal confident of prompt vindication.

General Dearborn felt certain that this court, consisting as it did of honorable and with a fair average of experienced soldiers, would necessarily

EXONERATE GENERAL HULL

and at least incidentally place censure upon himself, and an order was issued dissolving the court and preventing the investigation so much desired by General Hull.

Immediately a most discreditable plot was planned which is without an equal in the annals of judicial proceeding.

A portion of the press under the patronage of the Administration, Dearborn, as commander-in-chief, being as it were, a part of it, kept up a series of articles to influence the public mind favorable to the Administration and General Dearborn and unfavorable to General Hull, and at the end of the year

ANOTHER COURT

was directed to convene.

Of the fourteen officers appointed upon this court, thirteen of whom were to try General Hull, and determine matters which ought by right

to be submitted only to officers of the highest honor and military experience and learning, twelve were men from civil life, whose occupations and calling had been

CIVIL AND POLITICAL

rather than military.

Eight of them were not in the military service at all during the campaign of 1812, and the average length of time they all had held commissions was less than a year.

These men owed their positions as generals, colonels, and lieutenant-colonels, not because of any service whatever, but because they were violent political partisans and supporters of the Administration (see Clarke's Campaign, 1812, page 423).

They did not enter the Army as a profession, and it would seem had no idea of remaining in the Army, and in point of fact they returned to civil and most of them to political life upon the close of the war. Not one of them ever received a brevet or any kind of promotion for service, and as far as can be learned not one of the twelve was ever in battle.

Colonel Gardner's excellent work, which gives the record and a sketch of all Army officers and carefully mentions all service in battles, recites the records of all these twelve officers, giving a sketch of their service in and out of the Army, and these records do not show that any one of the eight was ever in or near any battle or skirmish or action of any kind whatever, and investigations indicate that this is equally true regarding eleven of these officers. If all else had been fair and just the appointment of

SUCH A BODY OF MEN

to try a veteran of twenty battles and a trusted friend of Washington was sufficient to put the stamp of dishonor upon the entire proceeding.

But to make matters worse, one of these members, Colonel Conner, was at the time upon the staff and a member of the military family of General Dearborn, and owed to his influence a promotion to lieutenant-colonel just before the court convened as well as all previous appointments and promotions. Two other members of this court had been recently promoted, and three others were or had been members of General Dearborn's military family, and were generally regarded as thoroughly under his influence.

Certainly such a court could be relied upon to protect General Dearborn and the Administration, no matter what evidence was produced;

they were mere parasites, without character to lose, unknown to fame, and

MEN WHO REMAINED UNKNOWN

to the end of their days; a pack of subservient tools to echo the wishes and mandate of General Dearborn, the commander of the American Army.

That mandate was, so far as in them lay, to strike at the honor of a brave and trusted officer of General Washington.

The law gives a majority of a military court the power to make a verdict.

These young unknown tools of the Administration could certainly outvote Colonels Fenwick and House, who were regular officers and who might be supposed to be men of integrity. Certainly with that majority in his favor General Dearborn ought to have felt certain of being protected, and all these men knew that

HULL'S CONVICTION WAS DEARBORN'S VINDICATION.

But with all this Dearborn was not satisfied. His vindication appeared to be his uppermost thought. Fenwick and House might influence these young members to regard their oaths and do justice to General Hull.

DEARBORN WAS COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF

of the American Army. A war was being waged and then at its height which jeopardized the existence of our country as a separate nationality. Certainly his duty demanded that he should remain in the field where his soldiers were standing in line of battle. This was eminently true, but it was also true that General Dearborn's

PERSONAL INTEREST CALLED HIM ELSEWHERE.

Hull's acquittal was his condemnation.

This must be averted at the expense of country, and, if need be, of honor.

If he were on the court his vote at all hazards was sure to be for Dearborn and against Hull, and his influence with the young men, most of whom owed their positions to him, and all of whom, it might be presumed, looked to him for future preferment, would no doubt, the schemers hoped, attain the wicked end they desired.

To the astonishment of every one, Major-General Dearborn, the commander-in-chief of the American armies, was ordered to act as president of this court, and to the greater astonishment of those who did not know him, he

and went to Albany to sit in trial and render a verdict in a case which was essentially, paramountly, and virtually his own.

To do this took him from the field from early in December, 1813, to some time in April, 1814, which shows what was sacrificed in order that this man might determine his own cause.

So much for the constitution of this inquisition.

It would be interesting if we could get a correct view of the proceedings of this remarkable tribunal, but that we are denied. We see that General Hull in his defense often alludes to the failure of the recording officer to write down rulings and even evidence which would benefit the accused, and he therefore appeals to the members of the court to recall the omitted paragraphs.

There were some things, however, which they allowed to be spread upon the record to which we shall make some allusion.

The court met January 3, 1814.

Four principal witnesses of the Government were present, but the court declined to proceed, says the record, "for want of witnesses."

They adjourned from time to time until January 19, and thus for sixteen days the commander of the American Army, in the height of war, kept himself and thirteen other

OFFICERS IDLE AT ALBANY,

when they were so much needed to confront the enemies of our country. The purpose to be subserved by this delay was soon developed.

On the 19th the array of Government witnesses were assembled, with many indications that they had been drilled to do the work needed by their masters.

The whole concourse were brought into court and General Cass, the most talented, led off with his evidence, to which the others

LISTENED WITH SUCH CARE

as it was thought at the time would prevent the possibility of embarrassing contradictions.

General Hull had made so many objections to the various unlawful proceedings of the court, which had in every case been overruled, that he finally determined not to go through the useless form of further protestations.

One honorable officer of the court, however, upon his own motion, insisted that this

TUITION OF WITNESSES

should not be allowed; but he was promptly rebuked by General Dearborn, who stated it was not necessary, in his judgment, to examine these witnesses separately. (Hull's Trial, Appendix, page 17.)

General Hull had from the first been

DENIED THE PRIVILEGE OF COUNSEL

to address the court, although the Government employed Hon. A. J. Dallas and Hon. Martin Van Buren, then regarded as the ablest advocates in America, to conduct the prosecution.

If Hull was guilty of anything it was improperly surrendering the garrison at Detroit, which charge could have been expressed in a dozen lines, but these astute lawyers drew up a series of intricate charges covering over one hundred pages of ordinary paper.

In this mass of verbiage were concealed expressions admitting of various meanings, the real use to which they were to be applied never being developed until during the closing argument of the Government.

MOST FLAGRANT VIOLATIONS OF LAW

were permitted by this remarkable tribunal. Officers were permitted to testify to their recollection of written documents when the witnesses themselves admitted these documents were under the control of the prosecution and easily attainable, and this, too, even when the defense denied that the documents alluded to were such as described by the verbal testimony. (Hull's Trial.)

The prosecuting witnesses are here worth a passing notice. Their military experience, with few exceptions, had been confined to the two months' service under General Hull just preceding their capture by General Brock. During these two months their conduct had been insubordinate, mutinous, and almost treasonable. So ignorant were these men of military usage and propriety that they did not conceal the fact of their disobeying General Hull's orders, issued by him in June, for the army to march from Urbana to Detroit (see Memoirs, page 35), nor his orders to cross into Canada; nor did they deny their refusing to march to the Miami, stating they would desert rather than obey; nor did they deny that two days before the capture of the troops they were in open mutiny against their commander. On the contrary, they boasted of these acts, vindicating themselves with the statement that they had lost confidence in the military capacity of their commander.

The majority of the court seemed to concur with their witnesses in these views, and apparently commended such disgraceful and unmilitary conduct, all of them failing to observe that the first mutiny and disobedience of these officers was at Urbana, when General Hull first assumed command, with a reputation indorsed by Washington as one of the bravest and most skillful officers of the Revolution.

So little did the officers who conducted this prosecution know of military duty and propriety, that they even embodied in the charges (see Trial, Appendix, pages 7 and 14):

> That the officers and soldiers were induced to lose and did lose confidence in the courage and military capacity of their said commander.

Now, mark that this opinion of these men was reached before they saw General Hull in the presence of an enemy, and mark also that it was precisely the reverse of the opinion reached by Washington and Generals Wayne, Steuben, Saint Clair, Gates, Heath, Commodore Charles Stewart, Majors Bannister and McCracken, and Governor Brooks and Captain Tufts. These illustrious men, as shown by history, witnessed and testified to General Hull's intrepidity, courage, skill at Dorchester Heights, White Plains, Trenton, Morrisania, Princeton, Ticonderoga, Bemis Heights, Stillwater, Saratoga, Monmouth, and Stony Point. Some witnessed what they termed Hull's heroic conduct at some battles and others witnessed and admired the courage he displayed upon other fields in which they participated.

Also, continue Hull's accusers of 1812 who had never seen him in battle:

> The officers and soldiers naturally became dissatisfied and disgusted.

These men, without military knowledge or experience, were selected by General Dearborn and the Government to give their opinions regarding General Hull's conduct and to testify against him.

Some of them had been promoted from the rank of lieutenant-colonel of militia to the rank of general in the regular Army and others of lesser rank had received promotion on a similar scale.

Of the fourteen witnesses relied upon by the Government, all came with commissions as officers of the regular Army.

Twelve of the fourteen had been recently appointed from civil life or the militia service, and all had very recent commissions, some dated three months before the sitting of the court, some dated eight months

previously, and some received promotion and commissions while waiting as witnesses at the trial.

All of these promotions must have been given to

PAY FOR THEIR EVIDENCE,

as neither Gardner's Dictionary of the Army nor any other work records that they ever did any creditable service, and so far as most of them are concerned they did no service at all before the promotion, and it can hardly be supposed that it was intended for these witnesses to do service afterward, as the same records show they did nothing after they left the court.

Even without this bribery of rank they had

STRONG INDUCEMENTS

to swear to suit the prosecution, because if Hull should be vindicated how could they justify their disobedience of orders and their mutiny and conspiracy, or, as these mutineers expressed it, "to incur the responsibility of divesting the general of his command."

They were the men who were to go into court and give evidence as to their opinions regarding the propriety of orders which two years before they had refused to obey. They were also to give in evidence their opinion as to the capacity of the commander they had "conspired to divest of his command," a conspiracy which they were only prevented from carrying out by Colonels Cass and McArthur being detached with their regiments. Could any doubt arise in the mind of General Dearborn what would be the evidence of such witnesses?

It was true that a cross-examination developed a great deal to break the force of their opinions and to materially embarrass the witnesses, but this had probably been anticipated, and Hull was unlawfully

REFUSED THE RIGHT TO HAVE COUNSEL

to assist him in the cross-examination of witnesses, and the bad effect arising therefrom was also in some degree prevented by vigorous applause from the Administration organs, which were lavishly distributed and, together with pamphlets containing most scandalous falsehoods, hawked for sale at every door of the Capitol while the trial was progressing. (Memoirs of 1812, page 13.)

One point in evidence is also worthy of notice.

Militia officers who had never been in battle, and who only saw General Hull while he was inside the fort or inclosure, gave their opinion

that he was influenced by fear, because they saw him in a safe place and marks of tobacco-juice were about his mouth.

Now, it must be observed that seven militia officers who gave that character of evidence all testify that they saw General Hull inside the fort and out of danger, while regular officers like Colonels Miller and Kingsbury and Captain Maxwell, who had been in over twenty battles, testify that they saw

GENERAL HULL EXPOSED TO THE ENEMY'S FIRE

on the advanced line while balls were passing and repassing, and that he, General Hull, appeared firm, cool, and collected. (Hull's Trial, pages 128 and 129; Appendix, page 103, and Appendix No. 2, page 7.)

It must be observed that General Hull was with his advanced line under fire during the 15th; was on the line during the night of the 15th and on the morning of the 16th.

Lieutenant Bacon swore that he saw General Hull once on the 15th on the parapet, and once on the 16th. He saw him also in different parts of the fort during the cannonade, and that General Hull appeared engaged as usual. (Hull's Trial, page 124.)

Colonel Richard Platt also swore that General Hull's character stood in cardinal points, intelligent, brave, active and enterprising. (Hull's Trial, page 145.)

Is it not remarkable that brave veterans should see General Hull firm, collected, and

COOL WHILE UNDER FIRE,

and that men who had never seen a battle and who testify they were in a place of safety when their observations were made, should when they saw General Hull in a place of safety be of opinion he was deficient in courage? (Hull's Trial, page 128; Appendix, 103.)

Major-General Heath, Major Bannister, Captain Francis Tufts, Governor Brooks, Major McCracken, and Admiral Charles Stewart, all war-worn veterans, testified to General Hull's distinguished gallantry.

How disgraceful in the face of all this credible evidence for the court to give weight to the evidence of militia officers who had never been in battle, and whose interest induced them to swear falsely against their commander to as far as possible justify their "disobedience of orders," "insubordination," "threatened desertion," "mutiny," and "conspiracy" during the two months they were under the command of General Hull. (Hull's Trial, page 66, Appendix.)

Such were the men who, as experts in military experience, science, and art, were called before the tribunal to give opinions regarding the military character and the propriety of military measures adopted by General Hull.

The Administration sent them there with high-sounding titles of military rank—generals and colonels who had never seen a battle or had any military experience. (Hull's Trial, Appendix, page 64.)

A number of official documents which

EXONERATED GENERAL HULL

and placed blame upon General Dearborn and the Administration were known to be upon file in the War Department.

They were applied for by General Hull to use as evidence, but under the false plea that the documents could not be found the officials in Washington allowed the court to adjourn without giving the accused their benefit. That these papers were at this time available to the Government and to Dearborn, the president of the court, is evident from the fact that twelve years afterward, when John C. Calhoun became Secretary of War, he found them regularly filed in the Department, and promptly furnished them upon General Hull's application.

Bad as was all this, a crowning infamy was found to be necessary and was therefore enacted.

So exemplary had General Hull's conduct been that with all the efforts of Dearborn and the Administration no evidence had been produced which would justify an honorable man in doing otherwise than declaring that General Hull deserved commendation rather than the slightest censure, and some of the members of the court

REVOLTED AT THE TERRIBLE INDIGNITY

which was sought to be enacted.

On a military court the members are all jurors as well as judges. To sustain the charges against Hull the vote of two-thirds of the court was necessary. Some of the members had been absent from time to time during the three months occupied in taking testimony. It is evident that General Dearborn became apprehensive the vote of these absent members would be necessary to sustain him and the Administration by General Hull's conviction. It is a rule of both military and civil law, as old as law itself, that each juror must see the witnesses for the prosecution give in their evidence, so that he can judge of its credibility. This

rule is unvarying in all civilized countries, and is regarded as one of the most important safeguards of liberty. The honorable members of the court felt that their oaths compelled them to exclude these members and not permit them to vote upon the findings of the court.

On March 7 the Government completed its evidence and had proven nothing to Hull's detriment. Therefore we see (Hull's Trial, page 155) that "General Hull stated he had no evidence to adduce but what was by way of depositions."

Many days were then occupied in speeches by Hon. Martin Van Buren and Hon. A. J. Dallas, the counsel employed to prosecute for the Government.

Colonel Forbes, the reporter, says (page 2, Hull's Trial):

> I have to regret, moreover, that I did not take down *verbatim* the summing up by Hon. Martin Van Buren, the special judge-advocate; the ability and perspicuity displayed by him extemporaneously on an occasion so novel to him excited, I can venture to say, the admiration of one of the most numerous and respectable audiences that ever attended a court-martial in the United States.

General Hull was refused by the court the privilege of introducing counsel to reply to these able jurists, but above and beyond that General Dearborn found

ANOTHER ATROCITY NECESSARY.

More than four months had elapsed since the court was ordered and nearly three since it commenced its sittings. Members, as before stated, had been absent much of the time, and it is convincing that now General Dearborn found that the votes of these absent members were necessary to his purposes, and an order is produced which contained the following directions:

> A member of the court who has been absent may take his seat after such absence, and in case an absent member returns and resumes his seat the proceedings which have been had in his absence must be read to him.

Pursuant to this nefarious and unlawful ruling absent members were brought back and voted upon the finding of the court, and this, too, against the protest of honorable members of this tribunal, and thus ended the most atrocious outrage which was ever perpetrated under the form and guise of justice.

I will read a paragraph from page 92 of Captain De Hart's excellent work on court-martial:

> If a member of a court-martial should for any cause be absent from his seat during the course of the trial, he can not resume it. It would have been considered vacated, and thus he is excluded from any further participation in the

trial. All the members of a court-martial must be present during the proceedings on the reception of testimony, and resumption of his place by a member who has been absent for any period while proceedings were going on would vitiate the judgment of the court. It is essentially necessary that witnesses be examined in the presence of all the members of the court, for no act performed by a part of the court can be legal. The mere reading the recorded testimony in the presence of the deponent is not sufficient.

A case of this description is quoted by Captain Simmons, page 176, in which the reviewing authority said, "This proceeding is so directly at variance with the practice of courts-martial and the principles of justice that it may be held to affect the legality of the judgment of the court," and concluded his remarks by stating that "the irregularity before observed has rendered nugatory the sentence of the court-martial."

In addition to the many other illegalities and wrongs committed in this prosecution, six distinct provisions of the Constitution of the United States were trampled under foot. I read these words of the Constitution:

In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and public trial by an impartial jury, * * * to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation; to be confronted with the witnesses against him; to have compulsory process for obtaining witnesses in his favor, and to have the assistance of counsel for his defense.

All these guarantees were denied General Hull:

First. He was refused a speedy trial.

Second. He was brought before an interested instead of an impartial jury.

Third. He was not informed of the nature and cause of the accusation.

Fourth. He did not have process for obtaining witnesses in his favor, and was refused evidence of a documentary character.

Fifth. He was positively refused the right to introduce counsel to assist him in his defense.

Sixth. He was not confronted by the witnesses against him. The object of this provision is to have the witnesses confront the court, who are to thus determine their credibility, and hence the gross illegality of the order which it is charged was procured by General Dearborn, and which placed officers on the court to vote on the findings who had not been present, and who had therefore not been confronted by the witnesses who had testified against Hull. This was a flagrant violation of the spirit and meaning of the Constitution. The Constitution does not limit these provisions to civil trials, and even if it did so, the principles are so just and necessary to all tribunals which seek to dispense justice that to disregard them would vitiate and make void any legal procedure.

As additional proof that no sentence of the court was intended to be carried out and that the whole matter was prearranged, I will call attention to the fact that when the proceedings, amounting to thousands of pages, reached Washington and before time had elapsed to give the record of a five months' court any proper examination, the President terminated the half-year's operation of the commander-in-chief of the armies by issuing the following order:

APRIL 25, 1814.

The sentence of the court is approved and the execution of it remitted.

JAMES MADISON.

General Hull returned to his home at Newton, Massachusetts, and at that place and Boston and other cities he was received with the most distinguished attention. Dinners were tendered to him by the most eminent citizens, and unqualified indignation was expressed at the dishonorable course pursued by those who were responsible for the atrocious proceedings of which he was the sufferer.

Some historians, actuated by prejudice, some actuated by a desire to defend General Dearborn, and some through a want of correct information, have made very untruthful statements which did General Hull great injustice, but many have sought to give a correct narration of these operations.

Since I began these comments my attention has been called to Lossing's Pictorial Field Book of the War of 1812. Mr. Lossing says:

I have given in this and the preceding chapter as faithful a general history of Hull's campaign as a careful and dispassionate study of documentary and other contemporaneous narratives, written and verbal, have enabled me to do.

I have recorded what I believe to be undoubted facts. As they stand in the narrative, unattended by analysis, comparison, or argument, they present General Hull in his conduct of the campaign in some instances in an unfavorable light.

But after weighing and estimating the value of these facts in connection with current circumstances to which they bore a positive relationship—after observing the composition of the court-martial, the peculiar relations of the court and the witnesses to the accused, and the testimony in detail, the writer is constrained to believe that General Hull was actuated throughout the campaign by the purest impulses of patriotism and humanity. * * *

When he could perceive no alternative but surrender or destruction, he bravely determined to choose the most courageous and humane course, so he faced the taunts of his soldiers and the expected scorn of his countrymen, rather than fill the beautiful land of the Ohio and the settlements of Michigan with mourning.

Hull had warned the Government of the folly of attempting the conquest of Canada without better preparation; but the young hot-bloods of the Administration—Clay and others—could not wait; and the President and his Cabinet, lacking all the essential knowledge of planning a campaign, had sent him on an errand of vast importance and difficulty without seeming to comprehend its vastness or estimating the means necessary for its accomplishment.

The conception of the campaign was a huge blunder, and Hull saw it, and the failure to put in vigorous motion for his support auxiliary and co-operative forces was criminal neglect.

When the result was found to be a failure and humiliation the Administration perceived it and sought a refuge. Public indignation must be appeased; the lightning of the public wrath must be averted.

General Hull was made the chosen victim for the peace-offering, the sin-bearing scape-goat; and on his head the fiery thunderbolts were hurled. The grass has grown greenly upon his grave for more than forty years. Let his faults (for like all men he was not immaculate) also be covered with the verdure of blind charity. Two generations have passed away since the dark cloud first brooded over his fair fame. We may all see if we will, with eyes unfilmed by prejudice, the silver edging which tells of the brightness of good intentions behind it, and prophecies of evanishment and a clear sky. Let history be just, in spite of the clamors of a hoary error.

If I had time I would also read from J. H. Patton, in his History of the United States, and Colonel T. W. Higginson in his Youth's History of America.

From Harper's Cyclopædia, which has just been handed me, I read the close of a sketch of General Hull:

His name and fame now appear in history untarnished.

From the same work these words close the account of the trial:

To-day the character of General William Hull, purified of unwarranted stains, appears in history without a blemish in the eye of just appreciation.

After many delays General Hull succeeded in procuring from the War Department a number of public documents which were denied him during the trial ten years previous. These, together with other documents, were published in the American Statesman, a Boston paper, and they were copied in other papers and exercised a great influence on the public mind.

Mr. Jared Sparks, in a notice of these documents in the North American Review, said "that from the public documents collected and published the conclusion must unequivocally be drawn that General Hull was required by the Government to do what was morally and physically impossible that he should do." Many other periodicals throughout the Union expressed the same opinion.

Just before General Hull's death the Marquis de Lafayette, a younger man than himself, came to this country and made him a special visit. His declining years were made happy by the reception of very many letters from various distinguished persons, particularly from old companions of the Revolution, expressing their pleasure that he had so completely vindicated his conduct and character. Surrounded by his

family he passed quietly and sweetly from this life, declaring on his death-bed in the most solemn manner his conviction that he had done right in surrendering Detroit, and expressing his happiness that he had saved the lives of the peaceful citizens of Michigan, who for seven years he had protected as their governor, from being needlessly sacrificed.

CONCLUSION.

In all the cases that I have appended it will be observed there is a marked similarity. This is natural, because the evil inclinations and passions of men are the same in all ages. Particularly do we see a resemblance between the Hull case and that of Fitz-John Porter. Both were men whose services and gallant conduct had been the admiration of the nation. Both were arraigned pursuant to an afterthought—Porter after a lapse of three, Hull after the lapse of sixteen months. Both applied for an investigation the moment they heard whispers of complaint. Both were refused official documents necessary to their defense. The conviction in both cases was necessary to atone for blunders of their commanders.

Both were assailed by vindictive and ambitious subordinates; particularly is this a prominent feature in the case of General Hull. Both were tried by a court some of the members of which were directly interested in their conviction, and the records of both courts show that shameful illegalities were necessary to carry out the purposes of their accusers, and much of the evidence of the witnesses for the prosecution in both cases was an *ex parte* defense of themselves; and finally the printed records of both cases is their emphatic and complete vindication.

Both are similar in this: The first printed record in the Porter case was an imposition and a falsehood, because it omitted all the points of Porter's defense, and the record in Hull's case shows for itself that it was manipulated and contorted to make the best case possible for the Government. Evidence favorable to Hull is shown to be omitted, and illegal rulings detrimental to him were not recorded.